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The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  implement  distributional  considerations  in  comparing  the 
economic well-being of individuals over time and living in different regions in Italy. Both 
Absolute Lorenz Curves (ALC) and standard Lorenz curves are used to address this issue 
from both a national and regional perspective. Since only partial results are obtained from 
dominance  conditions,  the  analysis  of  Gini  (ANOGI)  is  also  introduced.  We  found  that 
differences among subpopulation distributions accentuate over time and that when South 
and Islands are used as a reference group, North-West and North-East form two relatively 
more distinct groups. 
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1. Introduction 
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  implement  distributional  considerations  in  comparing  the 
economic well-being of individuals over time and living in different regions in Italy. In this 
sense,  the  aim  is  to  implement  the  recommendations  of  the  Stiglitz’s  (2009)  report 
concerning  augmenting  national  accounts  by  distributional  considerations  in  an  easy  to 
implement environment. The easy environment follows because, instead of countries, we 
perform the implementation over regions in the same country, so that cultural and relative 
prices differences are less pronounced than in comparisons between countries. The first 
advantage  in  applying  the  methodology  to  regions  rather  than  to  countries  is  that  the 
differences between populations living in the same country, and the differences in other 
economic, cultural and geographical conditions as well as government's regulations and 
involvement are smaller than the differences when the comparison is done among countries. 
This reduces the number and the strength of assumptions one has to impose on the data. 
However, as we will see, even under such limited differences there are still many ethical 
problems one has to grapple with. The second advantage of using regions is to highlight 
differences in income distribution within the same country that are often concealed when 
using  national  figures.  An  analysis  by  regions  in  the  same  country  will  help  show  the 
possible “dualist” characteristic of the national economy and the persistence of distributional 
and welfare differences over time, which is a particularly important issue in Italy. 
We  also  restrict  the  implementation  to  individuals,  and  to  net  earnings  and  public 
pensions. The first restriction allows us to ignore differences in households' composition 
and structure. With regard to the second restriction , a first concern is related to the hard-
to-correct  imperfections  (including  tax  evasion)  that  characterizes  self-employed,  capital 
and financial incomes and, more generally, all incomes other than earned incomes and public 
pensions.  Since  we  do  not  have  any  information  on  the  regional  distribution  of  these 
imperfections, we prefer to focus on the fraction of national income that is more reliably   3 
surveyed. A second concern is directly related to the relevance of earned incomes and public 
pensions on the functional distribution of national income. The share of earned incomes has 
decreased from 58 per cent of the mid-Seventies to about 51 per cent at the end of the 
Nineties, and has slightly increased to 55 per cent in the last decade. These changes may 
conceal important changes of the personal income distribution both in the country as a 
whole and across geographical areas, an issue that will be dealt with in what follows by 
taking as given the impact of tax and spending policies. 
The structure of the paper is the following: section 2 presents the welfare dominance 
approach; section 3 will focus on the decomposition of the Gini index; section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Welfare dominance 
2.1. A brief review of the methodology 
Hugh  Dalton  (1920)  argued  that  although  economic  welfare  is  measured  by  income,  it 
should also reflect economic well-being or social welfare. This argument has been made 
operational  in  a  seminal  paper  by  Atkinson  (1970)  who  has  proved  that,  given  two 
distributions of income with equal means, then one distribution dominates the other by all 
social  welfare  functions  with  a  positive  and  declining  social  evaluation  of  the  marginal 
utility of income if and only if the Lorenz curve of one distribution is not lower everywhere 
than the other. Instead, if the distributions intersect, then there exist two alternative social 
welfare functions with positive and declining social evaluation of the marginal utility of 
income  that  will  rank  the  distributions  in  a  contradicting  way.  Shorrocks  (1983)  has 
improved Atkinson's arguments by omitting the constraint on equal means. Specifically, 
Shorrocks proved that the Atkinson's proposition holds for all distributions if one replaces 
the  Lorenz  curve  by  the  Generalized  Lorenz  curve  (also  referred  to  as  Absolute  Lorenz 
Curve), whose ordinates, for a generic distribution F, can be expressed by  , where 
 is average income, L is the ordinate of the standard Lorenz curve and p is the proportion   4 
of population. Those rules are referred to as second-degree welfare dominance. More formally, 
this  criterion  requires  to  consider  a  class    of  social  welfare  functions  where 
 is the social evaluation of the marginal utility of income and  .1 In 
particular, it follows from Shorrocks (1983) that a necessary and sufficient condition for 
average social welfare to be greater in a distribution J compared with a distribution F, i.e. 
, is that  , i.e. J absolute-Lorenz dominates F (hereafter ALC), over the 
entire range (where absolute dominance is identified by  ). Necessary conditions for this 
welfare dominance are (Yitzhaki, 1982):  
(1)  , which corresponds to the extreme point of the r.h.s. of the ALC;  
(2)  , with G representing the Gini coefficient of the distribution. 
The term   is twice the area below the ALC. Also, Yitzhaki (1979) has shown that 
the latter condition represents a necessary condition for higher satisfaction according to 
Runciman's (1966) relative deprivation theory. The advantage of the rules that are based on 
the ALC over the use of a specific social welfare function is that since the rules apply to a 
wide class of possible social welfare functions we do not have to impose our social views on 
the analysis, and the analysis holds for a variety of social views. The advantage of the 
necessary conditions is that they are calculated for many countries and they increase our 
ability  to  rank  distributions.  It  seems  to  us  that  whenever  one  compares  social  welfare 
among  different  countries,  or  for  the  same  country  over  time,  it  is  important  to  avoid 
imposing the investigator's social views.   
 
                                                 
1 First-degree welfare dominance rules rely only on the assumption  , i.e. that the social evaluation of the marginal 
utility of income is positive. In this case a necessary and sufficient condition for dominance is that the income parade of one 
distribution is not lower than the other everywhere. We concentrate on second degree welfare dominance because first 
degree dominance cases rarely exist.    5 
2.2. Data 
Data are taken from the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) carried out by 
Bank of Italy in 1993, 2000 and 2008. In all years, households surveyed are about 8,000, for 
a corresponding number of individuals of 24,013 in 1993, 22,268 in 2000 and 19,907 in 
2008. The number of individuals having incomes is 14,395 in 1993; 13,814 in 2000; 13,266 
in 2008. 
An important feature of the data on incomes is that they are recorded net of taxes. The 
implication will be that our analysis will cover the distribution of net incomes (gross incomes 
net  of  taxes),  that  represent  the  resources  available  for  consumption.  In  particular,  we 
concentrate on the distribution of earnings and public pensions, that amount to more than 
75 per cent of the total declared income in all years. Therefore, in what follows, we will use 
the  term  “distribution  of  earnings”  to  include  incomes  of  employed  people  and  public 
pensions received after employment has ceased. 
Since  SHIW  data  allows  to  deal  with  individuals,  we  will  consider  a  distribution  of 
individual earnings. This will avoid working with households and make possible to disregard 
the controversial issue of equivalence scales. To this purpose, the SHIW dataset is therefore 
restricted  to  full-time  workers  having  positive  earnings  and  individuals  having  public 
pensions.2  An  extension  of  the  analysis  will  consider  five  macro-areas  in  the  country; 
according to the classification used by SHIW, they are: North-West (NW), North-East 
(NE), Centre (C), South (S), and Islands (I). 
 
2.3. Descriptive issues and welfare analysis at national level 
To introduce the issue, table 1 reports some summary information on the evolution of the 
distribution of net earnings in three years in the period 1993 to 2008. Nominal earnings 
have increased by about 25 per cent from 1993 to 2000 and by 28.3 per cent from 2000 to 
                                                 
2 The dataset does not contain individuals having earnings and public pensions at the same time.   6 
2008. In the same periods, inflation has grown by 22.7 and 19.7 per cent respectively. As a 
result, the growth of real earnings has been extremely low in the first period (1.9 per cent) 
and relatively higher in the second one (7.1 per cent). Cumulatively, this gives rise to an 
increase of about 9.1 per cent above the overall inflation rate of 46.9 per cent from 1993 to 
2008, which means an average annual growth rate of about 0.6 per cent.3  
Table 2 gives further preliminary insights on the characteristics of earnings, introducing 
indicators by macro-areas. The last row indicates that the amount of earnings and public 
pensions is around 70 per cent of total income (as estimated by SHIW) in all years, which 
makes  earnings  an  important  income  source  for  the  dynamics  of  inequality  of  the  total 
income distribution in Italy. This amount of earnings involves an increasing number of 
adult  individuals.  Adults  having  positive  earnings  (as  a  fraction  of  the  total  adult 
population)  were  64.7  per  cent  in  1993,  67  per  cent  in  2000  and  69.6  in  2008.  These 
numbers are however slightly differentiated across geographical areas: in 2008, both the 
maximum  share  of  having  earnings  (74.6  per  cent)  and  the  highest  number  of  adult 
individuals having positive earnings is in NE (75.7 per cent), marking a structural difference 
between  North  and  South,  especially  with  regard  to  the  number  of  individuals  having 
positive earnings, always well below 60 per cent in both S and I in all years considered. 
In order to capture the essential movements of the distribution of earnings at national 
level, figure 1 plots the density function of real net earnings in the three years. The growth 
of the mode, the median and the mean level of earnings over the period can be appreciated 
by the rightward shift of the density function, especially in 2008 as a result of a higher 
growth of average real earnings. The structural difference of 2008 is also confirmed by the 
fact that while the level of real average earnings falls within the 55th percentile in 1993 and 
in  2000,  the  distribution  becomes  slightly  less  symmetric  in  2008,  where  the  average 
earning falls within the 59th percentile. 
                                                 
3 This finding is in line with what reported by the survey on employment income by Bank of Italy.   7 
With regard to the welfare implications, figure 2 depicts the popular income parades, and 
shows that the inverse of the cumulative density functions intersect at some points. Thus, a 
first degree welfare dominance of either distribution is ruled out. As expected, there is no 
unanimous ranking of the three earning distributions according to the class of additively 
separable social welfare functions with the only requirement being   (i.e. a positive 
marginal social evaluation of incomes).  
With regard to the possibility of a second-degree welfare dominance, consider first the 
necessary conditions (Yitzhaki, 1982). Condition (1) above gives  . Condition 
(2) yields  , where for simplicity of notation  , where k=93, 00, 
08.  Thus,  the  combination  of  the  two  necessary  conditions  suggests  that  2008  has  a 
potential larger welfare compared with the corresponding distributions in the other two 
years.  
The sufficient conditions of absolute Lorenz dominance are checked in figure 3, where, to 
gain in clarity, we scatter the differences at p of the ordinates of ALC for couples of years, 
instead of showing mostly overlapping absolute Lorenz curves. The outcome gives two 
cases  of  dominance,  i.e.   (identified  by  triangles)  and   
(identified by squares), and one case in which  , where the symbol   
indicates that the crossing occurs from above and may give rise to restricted (R) welfare 
prescriptions. The cases of dominance imply that unanimous social welfare prescriptions 
about the welfare properties of the distribution of earnings of 2008 can be safely achieved. 
In  the  other  case  (1993  vs.  2000),  a  crossing  occurs  in  the  lowest  part  of  the  income 
distribution (in fact within the first decile).  In principle, this would mean that the most 
Rawlsian social welfare functions might approve the earning distribution of 1993. But “how 
much” Rawlsian?   8 
To investigate this issue one can adapt the approach developed by Yitzhaki (1982). To 
this purpose, define  , where ALC is the absolute 
Lorenz curve, F is the cumulative distribution function and v can be interpreted as a degree 
of inequality aversion. It can easily be seen that for v=2, R(2) is simply the cumulated 
difference between absolute Lorenz curves. Now, if the absolute Lorenz curves intersect 
once,  there  exists    such  that  .  Also,  it  must  be  that 
 for   and   for  . It follows from (1) that if 
there exists a   by which  , then   for all   and   for all  . 
As argued by Yitzhaki (1982), the importance of this result is that if the ALC intersect once, 
we can know how the distributions will be ranked by the different v. 
By applying this approach to the case   gives a value of  , which 
is an extremely high value of inequality aversion. This implies that the earning distribution 
of 2000 can safely be preferred for a large set of values of inequality aversion. In fact, the 
computed value of v introduces a very mild restriction to the class of SWF, admitting that 
only those extremely averse to inequality would approve the earning distribution of 1993 
instead of that of 2000. An alternative reasoning for ignoring the crossing of the ACLs is 
that it may be due to the deviation of the empirical ACL from the population's ACL.   
 
2.4. Welfare analysis by macro-areas 
An  interesting  question  to  address  is  therefore  whether  additional  information  can  be 
obtained by moving to an analysis by macro-areas and whether results are robust to a 
regional disaggregation. To this purpose, we can make recourse to the same strategy used 
for the national case, i.e. to consider first necessary conditions, then sufficient conditions 
through the use of ALC and possibly restrictions on the class of admissible social welfare 
functions. In this case, we have two dimensions to explore. The first, analogously to the   9 
national case, is to examine welfare dominance across years within each macro-area. This is 
a  natural  extension  of  the  previous  integration.  The  second  is  to  investigate  welfare 
dominance  across  macro-areas  in  each  year,  in  order  to  set  a  regional  ranking  among 
earning distributions. 
 
2.4.1. Welfare dominance across years 
Consider first the necessary conditions for welfare dominance. For all couples of years t and 
τ – and in each macro-area – we examine the relationships   and  . The first 
condition  gives  now  rise  to  two  alternative  rankings.  The  first  is    for 
, while the second is   for  . Thus, both the potential 
superiority of the distribution in 2008 and the more problematic ranking between 2000 and 
1993 are confirmed.  The second condition gives instead rise to a symmetric matrix whose 
outcome is:  
a)   in all macro-areas; 
b)   in all macro-areas; 
c)   with the exceptions of S and I. 
Again, the welfare superiority of 2008 emerges. But also in this case, there are some areas 
where the ranking between 1993 and 2000 is controversial.  
With regard to the sufficient conditions, figure 4 reports separate information on ALC 
for each macro-area, showing a more problematic picture. Conditions that may potentially 
give rise to unanimous welfare prescriptions, as before, must be found in scatters either 
entirely above or entirely below the x-axis. Cases of dominance over the whole range are 
not  many  across  macro-areas,  but  all  involve  2008.  In  particular,  , 
,  ,   and  . The violation of 
the dominance in the other comparisons involving 2008 implies that this distribution of   10 
earnings  is  less  welfare  superior  than  what  the  necessary  conditions  might  indicate.  In 
particular, there are multiple crossings between 2008 and 2000 in NW, NE and C; between 
2008 and 1993 in C, while some multiple crossings also prevail between 1993 and 2000 in C, 
S and I. Finally, there are also a number of cases where ALCs intersect once; in particular 
the intersection occurs between 1993 and 2008 in NE and between 1993 and 2000 in NE 
and NW. The same methodology as above would give rise, in these cases, to values of 
inequality aversion between 18.4 (1993 and 2008 in NE) and 31.4 (1993 and 2000) in NW. 
Thus, as before, the earning distribution of 1993 could be approved only by SWF that are 
extremely averse to inequality, which means that the distributions of 2000 and 2008 could 
safely be preferred for a wide class of social welfare functions. 
The regional disaggregation highlights that the welfare superiority of the distribution of 
earnings in 2008 is less powerful than what emerges by the analysis at the national level. 
Basically, this welfare superiority is partially confirmed in NW and fully confirmed in S and 
I. This conclusion is particularly discouraging, as it would mean that the distributions of net 
earnings in the period considered may be subject to different rankings according to the 
index  of  inequality  chosen  and  to  the  degrees  of  inequality  aversions  attached  to  the 
underlying social welfare functions. 
 
2.4.2. Welfare dominance across macro-areas 
The second point to address is about welfare prescriptions for each year among macro-
areas. As before, it is worth starting from the necessary conditions for welfare dominance. 
In this case, the first condition gives the following picture: 
a)  ; 
b)  ; 
c)     11 
As  can  easily  be  seen,  the  ranking  among  macro-areas  is  not  the  same  in  the  years 
considered, yet a persistent result is that average earnings are higher in the North than in 
the South and in the Islands. The second condition gives again rise to a matrix where: 
a)   with the exception of 2008; 
b)   where   in all years; 
c)    with the exceptions of 1993; 
d)   where   in all years; 
e)   where   in all years; 
f)   with the exception of 2008. 
With regard to the sufficient conditions embodied in the ALC, figure 5 reports for each year 
all possible comparisons among macro-areas. Consider first 1993. Dominance occurs only in 
one case, involving NW and S (the top graph). In all other cases, different social welfare 
rankings may rank the distribution differently, as evident by the large number of cases in 
which the scatter crosses the x-axis. In particular, with only one exception, all comparisons 
among macro-areas give rise to multiple crossings. The exception relates to the comparison 
between NE and C; in this case,   , which means that there might be a 
restricted class of social welfare functions approving the earning distribution of NE. With 
the help of equation (1), one can find that  , which implies that all SWF with a 
higher degree of inequality aversion would approve the earning distribution of NE. In other 
words, the earning distribution of C would be approved only by the least inequality averse 
SWF. 
When moving to year 2000, the cases of dominance are more frequent. Both NW and NE 
dominate C, S and I. This means that, as a general outcome, the earning distribution in the 
North has more desirable welfare properties than the distribution of earnings in both the 
South  and  the  Islands,  which  is  another  way  of  observing  the  Italian  dualism.  Yet,   12 
, which again means that a ranking for all possible SWF is not possible. 
By restricting the class according to equation (1), would give  ; thus, only those 
SWF with extreme inequality aversion would prefer NE over NW. 
Some ranking is also possible between S and I, with the former distribution dominating 
on  the  second  over  the  entire  range.  Multiple  crossings  are  instead  observed  when 
comparing C with both S and I. The three earning distributions cannot therefore be ranked, 
that means that a neat separation occurs between the earning distributions in the North and 
those in the rest of the country. 
The situation in 2008 is much less defined. The cases of dominance declines to three and 
all involve NW (with the exception of the comparison with NE). This is further evidence 
that  –  over  time  –  the  earning  distribution  of  NW  has  gained  more  desirable  welfare 
properties  than  the  corresponding  earning  distributions  in  the  rest  of  the  country  (just 
recall that in 1993 only   occurred). A ranking between NW and NE is 
however  not  possible,  as  multiple  crossings  occur.  The  same  outcome  is  verified  when 
comparing  C  with  both  S  and  I,  and  S  with  I.  Finally,    and 
, but this would be approved only for very high degrees of inequality 
aversion (  and  , respectively). 
 
3. Disentangling average income and inequality 
The previous analysis has shown that dominance more likely occurs when the distribution 
of  earnings  of  2008  and  of  North-West  are  involved  in  the  comparisons.  Yet,  ALC 
dominance is the outcome of two elements, average income and inequality. In particular, the 
end point of ALC is affected by the level of average income (just recall that  ). 
Since  the  Northern  part  of  Italy  is  also  the  richest  one,  the  dominance  of  the  earning   13 
distribution of NW and NE could be partly driven by an average income effect and not by a 
genuine more equal distribution. 
Thus, it becomes of some relevance to disentangle these two effects for several reasons. 
First, by neutralising the differences in average incomes, one can understand which earning 
distribution is more desirable from a narrow inequality point of view. Second, by focusing 
on inequality, one can make recourse to the comparisons between Lorenz curves (LC), by 
which  dominance  will  imply  that  all  relative  inequality  measures  that  agree  with  the 
Dalton’s principle will show a reduction of inequality. Third, by comparing the results of 
ALC dominance and Lorenz dominance, one can check for the robustness of the previous 
results and shed further light on the Italian dualism among macro-areas. 
In  order  to  separate  average  income  and  inequality,  one  can  built  modified  earning 
distributions where all incomes in the earning distribution with the lower mean are rescaled 
by the ratio between average incomes. For example, if   all earnings in 2000 are 
multiplied by the ratio  . This assures   by at the same time preserving the 
degree of relative inequality of the earning distribution in 2000. Indeed, the Lorenz curves 
do not change when all incomes are multiplied by the same scalar. This means that the 
Lorenz  dominance  criterion  may  now  provide  information  on  the  ranking  by  relative 
inequality without being affected by the level of average income. Thus, the comparison with 
ALC dominance will allow us to disentangle whether the previous results are driven by an 
average income effect or by the impact of relative inequality. 
 
3.1. A national perspective 
Figure 6 is obtained by first rescaling all incomes of 1993 and 2000 to the average earning 
of 2008 and then by tracing the differences between the corresponding Lorenz curves. Less 
clear-cut  results  emerge  contrasted  with  the  case  of  ALC  dominance.  For  example,  the   14 
dominance of 2008 over 2000 disappears, as   and   now exhibit multiple crossings. 
In the same vein, a crossing at the very top of the income distribution occurs between   
and  , casting some doubts on the welfare superiority of the earning distribution of 2008 
from an inequality point of view. The comparison with the ALC criterion, indeed, suggests 
that the dominance of 2008 was mainly driven by an average earning effect and not by a less 
unequal earning distribution. The comparison between   and  , instead, confirms the 
previous result, that 1993 could be preferred only for extremely inequality averse social 
welfare functions. Thus, the growth of average income occurred in 2008, compared with 
1993 and 2000, has not necessarily be associated to a less unequal earning distribution at 
national level. Crossings of Lorenz curves imply that relative inequality measures might 
rank these earning distributions in a contradictory way, that depends on the investigator’s 
social views. 
 
3.2. Lorenz dominance between macro-areas 
The next step is to verify whether we may gain additional information by replicating the 
previous analysis by macro-areas. Just recall from the ALC criterion that NW has more 
desirable welfare properties. Figure 7 reports the differences between Lorenz curves at p, 
after proportionally rescaling all incomes to obtain the same average income prevailing in 
NW in each year. The most striking result is that the desirability of the earning distribution 
of NW is confirmed only in 1993 and (weakly) with respect to NE, C and S and with the 
exception of I. In all other years (2000 and 2008) the earning distribution of NW crosses all 
other distributions at least once, which makes NW – possibly – only more weakly preferable 
from an inequality point of view. Thus, again, most of the ALC dominance outcomes seem 
to be driven by an average income effect, rather than by a genuine less unequal earning 
distribution.   15 
Cases of LC dominance can also be traced. In particular, in 2008, NE is less unequal than 
C; S is less unequal than NE; S and I are less unequal than C. This outcome partially 
confirms the impression that the richest part of the country (the North) has higher income 
and higher inequality, while the poorest one (the South) combines a lower average income 
with a more uniform earning distribution. Note, however, that the previous results are only 
weakly confirmed in 2000 and in 1993, as all combinations show at least one crossing. 
 
4. The decomposition of the Gini index 
The main conclusions of sections 2 and 3 are that without strong ethical assumptions it will 
be unrealistic to expect for definitive results when comparing the social welfare implications 
of income distributions among countries or even regions. Therefore, it is worth to limit our 
expectations. Since the Gini coefficient is the most popular measure of inequality, and forms 
necessary  conditions  for  welfare  dominance,  it  is  worth  to  investigate  the  additional 
information that can be obtained from this index.  
As  we  have  seen,  the  necessary  conditions  for  second-degree  welfare  dominance  are 
based on comparing  , where k represent an area or a year. The same term is 
also  applicable  to  Runciman's  deprivation  theory  (Runciman,  1966;  Yitzhaki,  1979). 
However, according to Runciman's relative deprivation (RD) theory, stratified societies can 
tolerate higher inequality than non-stratified societies. Viewing regions in Italy as reference 
groups, the deprivation in Italy may also be a function of the stratification of the Italian 
distribution according to regions. According to RD theory, the more stratified is the Italian 
distribution,  the  more  tolerant  the  society  to  inequality.    By  decomposing  the  Gini 
coefficient to the contribution of different regions, we also get an index of overlapping, 
which  is  actually  the  inverse  of  stratification  (Yitzhaki,  1982).  Would  one  interpret  the 
Stiglitz's  report  as  recommending  the  implementation  of  the  RD  theory,  then  the   16 
decomposition of the Gini coefficient of Italy (or the world) to the contribution of regions 
(or countries) is called for.  
 
4.1. The ANOGI methodology 
In  the  absence  of  clear-cut  results  of  the  welfare  dominance  analysis,  it  is  worth 
decomposing the Gini index by population sub-groups. The method is called ANOGI – 
ANalysis  Of  GIni  –  which  is  based  on  decomposing  the  Gini  coefficient  according  to 
population sub-groups in a way which is similar to ANOVA – ANalysis Of VAriance (See 
the Appendix and Frick et al., 2006 for a full description of the methodology, the derivation 
and the properties of the parameters and estimators involved). The advantage of ANOGI 
over  ANOVA  is  that:  (a)  the  Gini  coefficient  forms  necessary  conditions  for  welfare 
dominance;  (b)  although  the  Gini  does  not  belong  to  the  group  of  additive  inequality 
measures (Cowell, 1980; Shorrocks, 1984) as Lambert and Decoster (2005) declared, 'the 
Gini coefficient reveals more'. The 'reveals more' means that in addition to the intra-group and 
inter-group inequality, it also reveals the degree in which the sub-populations are stratified, 
i.e., whether knowing that someone is from a given region enables us to predict her income. 
In this section we give a very brief review of the decomposition of the Gini of the entire 
population.4  
Let the population income distribution   be composed of the income distributions  , 
i=1,…,n, of the n subpopulations. The Gini of the entire population, denoted by  , can be 
decomposed into three components: a within component (intra-), a between component (inter-) 
and a component that is a function of the amount of overlapping among the subpopulations. 
The overlapping coefficient was introduced by Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) and modified 
in Yitzhaki (1994), and can tell us how much the distributions are intertwined. Intuitively, it 
                                                 
4  This  section  and  the  appendix  are  a  short  summary  based  on  Yitzhaki  and  Schechtman  (2009)  and  is  given  for 
completeness of the presentation.   17 
measures to what extent one group is overlapped by the other. The extreme lower bound 
occurs  when  there  is  a  complete  stratification,  i.e.  when  the  population  of  each  region 
occupies  a  given  range  and  the  ranges  do  not  intersect  (no  overlapping,  perfect 
stratification). The extreme upper bound for region A occurs when region B is concentrated 
inside the range of A, around the mean of region A, with no member of region A lying 
inside the range of region B. In this case, region A cannot be considered as a strata relative 
to B because the members of B separate the members of A that are below the average of A 
from those that are above it. Obviously, most cases are in between these two extremes. The 
measure is based on ranking the members of one region according to the ranking of the 
other. Its values range from 0 to 2, where 1 means that the distributions of the two regions 
are similar. 
When estimating the between component, there are two terms involved:   and  .   is 
based on the covariance between the mean value of each region and the average rank of its 
members in the overall distribution. On the other hand,   (Pyatt, 1976) is based on the 
covariance between the mean value of each region, and the ranking of the mean value in the 
distribution of mean-values of regions. By construction,  . The decomposition is best 
understood in comparison to ANOVA, as shown in Appendix 1. In particular, ANOGI offers 
an  additional  parameter  to  ANOVA  –  the  parameter  of  overlapping,  which  can  be 
interpreted as the inverse of stratification. Other parameters being equal, the higher the 
overlapping,  the  higher  the  intra-group  component  and  the  lower  the  between-group 
component.  
The interpretation of the decomposition used in this paper follows the one presented in 
Heller and Yitzhaki (2006) which deals with classification of snails, and the one presented 
by Frick and Goebel (2008) on the decomposition of well-being in Germany according to 
regions. Assume we are given two alternative classifications of the same entire population, 
into  several  sub-groups,  for  example  according  to  age  or  to  whether  one  belongs  to  a   18 
specific region. The variable we are interested in is income and the question we want to 
answer is which way of grouping is more stratified. We will say that age is a better classifier 
of the society if the intra-group inequality among age groups is lower than the intra-group 
inequality among regions (i.e. similar to each other) and overlapping between age groups is 
lower than overlapping between regions. In other words, we will define one classification as 
better than the other if the members of each subgroup are similar to each other (low intra-
group inequality) and different from members of other subgroups (low overlapping, high 
between-group  inequality).  As  can  be  seen,  the  higher  the  overlapping  the  lower  the 
between-group inequality and the higher the intra-group component. It is argued that given 
several classifications into subgroups of the same entire population, the grouping with the 
lowest overlapping (highest stratification) will be defined as the best grouping.5 
Finally, to accommodate RD theory to the decomposition of Gini, Runciman stressed the 
intra-group  effect  of  the  distribution  on  deprivation.  However,  if  one  assumes  that  the 
formation of reference groups is endogenous, determined by the members of the society that 
the individual is aware of, then overlapping also plays a role. The decomposition of the Gini 
enables one to distinguish (and quantify) between intra and inter –group deprivation and 
the effect of overlapping (i.e., stratification) on deprivation.  Further research is needed to 
elaborate upon those issues.     
  
4.2. Decomposing the Gini index 
As a preliminary step of the analysis, table 3 may help disentangle some features of the 
Italian level of earning inequality and of its evolution on the last fifteen years. The first 
three columns give indications on the fact that population has slightly reshuffled from NW 
                                                 
5 An additional concept that is used extensively in the literature is polarization. See, for example, Esteban and Ray (1994), 
Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) and the references there. See Yitzhaki (2010) for the connection between stratification and 
polarization.   19 
and I to other parts of the country. In the latter case (I), it is presumable that the Southern 
regions have attracted part of the population living in the smallest islands. The columns 
reporting average earnings, instead, give account of two things. The first is the well-known 
duality of the country, the richest North and the poorest South (including I in geographical 
terms). The ratio between the highest and the lowest average earning (in this latter case 
always involving either S or I) was 1.2 in 1993, it grows at 1.31 in 2000 and falls at 1.26 in 
2008. The second is that average earnings in real terms have increased most in NW and NE 
and less in S and I, with the result that the gap has not narrowed. 
Another way of looking at the evolution of the distance between earnings is by looking at 
the columns reporting mean ranks, i.e. the average rank of individuals living in a given 
macro-area. The difference between the column of mean earning and mean rank is that 
while the mean income is affected by extreme observations, in the mean rank each person is 
given her rank in the overall distribution. The average rank of an individual living in South, 
in 1993, was located at the 47.7th percentile of the country, while, in 2008, the rank of that 
individual has fallen to a lower 43.5th percentile. On the opposite side, an individual living in 
NW is stable around the 53th percentile (after having climbed at the 56th in 2000). But again, 
only in NW and NE the average rank has increased over the period, which means that the 
distance  between  the  mean  positions  in  different  geographical  areas  has  widened.  This 
means that stratification of the distribution according to regions has increased.  
Finally, in all cases, the path of regional Gini coefficients mimics the downward tendency 
at national level (even though for C the reduction is not monotonic). But it is in S and I 
(involving about 30 per cent of the Italian population and about 25 per cent of national 
earnings) that inequality reduces most; at the same time, S and I are also the macro-areas 
where the real increase of earnings is lower. The decomposition by between-group and 
within-group  Gini  shows  that  almost  all  inequality  is  due  to  intra-area  variations  of   20 
earnings rather than between-area variations. Even though small in size, however, it is 
worth noting that the between-component in 2008 has become four times that of 1993.  
Table 4 reports the decomposition of the Gini index using the analysis of Gini (ANOGI). 
Columns headed “sG” give the size of the intra-group component that, as expected, is the 
largest part of the total inequality measured by the Gini index. One can verify that, in all 
years, the largest contribution comes from NW and the lowest one from I. In 2008, NW – 
with about 31 per cent of earnings – is responsible of 8.5 Gini points of inequality, which 
means 31 per cent of intra-group inequality. I, with 6.3 per cent of earnings, is responsible 
of 1.8 Gini points and 6.6 per cent of intra-group inequality. 
The terms under the column “sG(O-1)”, instead, identify the revision of the contribution 
of each subpopulation to intra-group variability determined by the overlapping component. 
In particular, as argued by Frick et al. (2006), a negative revision of this contribution will 
occur when  , i.e. when the subpopulation forms a stratum in the national population. 
This systematically occurs for NW, NE and C. Interestingly, while this negative factor 
seems to converge to zero for NW and C, it does not for NE. These situations have different 
underlying  reasons,  however.  In  the  case  of  NW,  a  higher  degree  of  overlapping  is 
compensated by a lower income share and a slightly lower inequality. In the case of C, the 
higher  overlapping  and  income  share  are  instead  compensated  by  a  significantly  lower 
inequality. In NE, instead, the degree of overlapping decreases from 1993 to 2008, which 
means that this macro-area form a more distinct group now than in the past. This reduction 
is only partially compensated by the increase of the income share, as also inequality reduces 
substantially. This feature can to some extent capture the relatively faster growth of the 
North-East economy over the last decade, compared with rest of the country. 
In  the  case  of  S  and  I,  instead,  the  contribution  to  intra-group  inequality  must  be 
increased, as  , which means that the scatter of the ranks associated to individuals 
living in these two areas is larger than the scatter of the ranks of individuals in the national   21 
earning distribution. Quite interestingly, however, the revision of intra-group inequality 
becomes closer to zero in 2008; in both cases, this effect is mainly caused by a smaller 
departure of the ranks of S and I over time. 
Finally, further information on the decomposition of the Gini index can be captured by 
the  between-group  component.  Using  the  between-Gini  ( )  –  that  implies  that  each 
subpopulation is represented by its mean income and the mean rank of its members – we 
have already noted that the contribution to total inequality is very small, yet of relatively 
larger  size  in  2000  and  2008.  The  between-Gini  in  the  Pyatt’s  version  ( ),  gives  a 
stronger picture. Just recall that in this case, each subpopulation is represented by mean 
income and its rank (instead of the mean rank of the members). In NW, the mean income 
was at the 57.4th percentile in 1993 and at the 66.4th percentile in 2008. Thus, mean income 
in NW is climbing positions, while mean earnings in S and I are actually falling down; the 
corresponding ranks in the two areas were 49.5th and 48.6th percentiles, respectively, in 
1993 against 40.6st and 45.8th percentiles in 2008. Given that the distance between ranks of 
mean  incomes  in  different  areas  has  increased  over  time,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the 
between Gini-Pyatt gives a higher between-component, suggesting that inequality among 
areas has increased more than what the traditional between-Gini may in fact signal. Indeed, 
the  difference    identifies  the  effect  of  overlapping  on  the  between-group 
component.  Quite  interestingly,  this  difference  tends  to  increase,  which  means  that 
differences among subpopulation distributions accentuates over time. In 2008, overlapping 
of incomes has caused a loss of the between-area component by about 1.1 Gini points and 
increased  the  intra-group  component  correspondingly.  Overall,  although  there  is  an 
increase in the between-group inequality among regions according to Pyatt, there is also an 
increase in the effect of reduction in between-group due to overlapping. The stratification of 
Italy according to regions has negligibly increased in the nineties, but declined in the last 
decade.    22 
4.3. Overlapping and ranks 
Particularly  important  for  our  decomposition  is  then  the  information  given  by  the 
overlapping  coefficient.  This  helps  understand  whether  a  macro-area  forms  a  perfect 
stratum. This occurs when   (the overlapping coefficient equals the population share) 
while a value of 1 indicates that the distribution of the macro-area mimics the national 
distribution  of  earnings.  A  value  of    (the  upper  bound)  will  be  reached  if  all 
individuals of a given macro-area i would be concentrated inside the range of another region 
j with no member of j lying inside the range of region i. As expected, all coefficients are 
close to 1, that suggests that the earning distributions in macro-areas have a high degree of 
similarity with the national distribution. Yet, again as a possible result of the duality of the 
country, NW and NE form more distinct groups. 
Tables 5 and 6 report further useful information on the differences among macro-areas. 
In  particular,  table  5  shows  the  overlapping  matrix  between  macro-areas,  where  the 
columns indicate the macro-area that is used as the reference group. This matrix gives 
information on the extent to which region j (rows) is included in the range of the reference 
region i (columns). In 1993, when NW is the reference, all overlapping indexes are greater 
than 1. In general, this occurs the more group j is included in the range of distribution i. 
Being NW one of the richest part of the country, and with the lowest inequality, the other 
macro-areas are more likely included in its income distribution; also, it is more likely that a 
larger proportion of individuals living in the poorest areas fall in the range of the income 
distribution of NW. This is actually what occurs for S and I. For these two areas, things do 
not  change  significantly  if  either  NE  or  C  are  taken  as  the  base.  This  outcome  has  a 
counterpart in the numbers above the main diagonal, where  . Indeed, the more group 
j is included in i, the less distribution i will be included in j. This path is quite similar in 
2000 and 2008. The fact that when S and I are used as reference groups, NW and NE form 
two relatively more distinct groups is persistent; yet numbers in 2008 suggest that in many   23 
cases, the earning distributions of macro-areas have a slightly higher degree of overlapping 
than before. 
Table 6 finally presents the average ranking of members of one group in terms of the 
other. An average rank greater than 0.5 means that individuals in region j have higher ranks 
on average in the earning distribution of region i than in their own distribution, i.e. they 
form a richer group relative to the other region. Individuals in NW and NE have this 
characteristic in all periods compared with the other regions. It is worth noting that this 
situation has worsened in 2008 (contrasted with 1993), where people in S and I – that form 
a poorer group -  are just around the 45th – 48th percentile of the distributions in NW, NE 
and C. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This  paper  compares  the  distribution  of  earnings  and  public  pensions  in  Italy,  while 
imposing minimum ethical requirements. We have constrained ourselves to individuals to 
avoid imposing assumptions on the treatment of households with different size, and we 
restricted the comparison to Italian regions, in order to minimise differences in exogenous 
characteristics  (territory,  political  systems,  governmental  supplied  goods,  legal  systems, 
etc.). In the first part of the paper we have constrained ourselves to the second-degree 
necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  for  welfare  dominance.  The  necessary  and  sufficient 
conditions did not allow us plenty of ranking. In particular, the regional disaggregation has 
highlighted that the welfare superiority of the distribution of earnings in 2008 at national 
level is less powerful and fully confirmed only in S and I. Furthermore, across macro-areas, 
the cases of dominance are also not frequent and all involve the North-Western pat of Italy 
(NW). This is further evidence that – over time – the distribution of earnings in NW has 
gained more desirable welfare properties. However, when neutralising the effect of average 
income,  this  welfare  superiority  only  appears  in  1993,  which  means  that  from  a  purely   24 
distributive point of view the outcome is much more uncertain. Then, we restricted the 
analysis  to  necessary  conditions  only,  using  the  mean  and  the  Gini  coefficients,  two 
parameters that are already available for most countries. Applying necessary conditions 
only enabled us to rank a significant amount of the cases. We then moved to analyzing the 
decompositions of the Italian earning distribution over regions. We found that differences 
among subpopulation distributions accentuates over time and that when South and Islands 
are  used  as  a  reference  group,  North-West  and  North-East  form  two  relatively  more 
distinct groups. 
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Appendix 1 
 
The ANOGI methodology: a brief review 
 
Let        where Yu is the income of the entire population and Yi is the 
income of sub population i. (i=1,…,n). The Gini of the entire population, denoted by Gu, can 
be presented as: 
 
(A.1)   
 
where si denotes the share of region i in the overall income, Oi is the overlapping index of 
region  i  with  the  entire  population  (explained  below),    Gb  measures  the  between-group 
inequality and Gbp is Pyatt’s  between-group Gini (Pyatt, 1976). 
Formally, overlapping of the overall population by sub-population i is defined as: 
 
(A.2)                  
 
The denominator is (one-forth) of Gini's mean difference of group i, while the numerator is 
the covariance between the same observations and their rankings in the overall distribution. 
The overlapping coefficient can tell us how much the distributions are intertwined, or, in 
other words, tell us about the degree of assimilation.  
The other components of Equation (A. 1) that require an interpretation are   and  . 
 is based on the covariance between the mean value of each sub-group and the average 
rank of its members in the overall all distribution. On the other hand,   is based on the 
covariance between the mean value of each sub-group, and the ranking of the mean value in 
the distribution of mean-values. By construction,  . The role of the overlapping in 
Equation  (A.1)  can  be  seen  from  the  second  and  fourth  terms  on  the  right  side  of  the 
equation.  The  terms  ,    for  i=1,…,n  and    are  not  affected  by  the  degree  of 
overlapping. Therefore the higher the degree of overlapping between the sub-groups the 
higher the second term on the right hand side of (A.1) (intra-group component) and the 
lower the fourth term (between-group component).  
The decomposition is best understood in comparison to ANOVA, as shown in table A.1. 
As can be easily seen, ANOGI offers an additional parameter to ANOVA – the parameter of 
overlapping,  which  can  be  interpreted  as  the  inverse  of  stratification.  Other  parameters 
being equal, the higher the overlapping, the higher the intra-group component and the 
lower the between-group component.  
A further elaboration of two parameters that are involved in the decomposition enables 
one  to  capture  information  on  which  groups  are  contributing  to  the  quality  of  the 
decomposition,  as  portrayed  by  the  overlapping  index.  The  first  component  of  this 
additional decomposition is the comparison of the mean income of each group with the mean 
ranking  of  members  of  each  group  in  the  overall  population.  Formally,  the  following 
relationships hold: 
 
               
                40 
                
 
where   is the average rank of the members of group i in the population.   are the two 
components that represent group i in the between-group component and   is the degree 
by which members of group j are included in the range of group i. In a perfectly stratified 
society, the ranking of   and   are identical and all   and   are equal to zero. If they 




Table A.1 – Comparing ANOGI and ANOVA 
 
Components parallel to ANOVA  Formula  Range 
Intra-Group     
Between-Groups-Pyatt      
Additional Information provided by ANoGI   
Overlapping on Intra-Group 
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